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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 







 I. BACKGROUND 
 Carl Nelson appeals from an order for summary judgment 
entered on September 19, 1996, in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 ("section 1983").  On April 18, 1995, Nelson filed this 
action against George Jashurek under the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution.  In his complaint Nelson set forth that Jashurek, a 
Sheffield Township police officer, attempted to arrest him on 
July 9, 1994.  At that time Nelson was wanted for alleged 
violations of conditions of parole following his release from 
prison after a homicide conviction.  According to Nelson's 
complaint, he disobeyed Jashurek's orders to halt and instead ran 
away.  Jashurek pursued and caught Nelson, and a struggle ensued. 
 Nelson claims that he then sat down and that when he later got 
up from the chair, Jashurek beat him with a flashlight and used 
excessive and malicious force to subdue him.  Nelson asserts that 
he sustained physical and psychological injuries as a result of 
Jashurek's actions. 
 After arresting Nelson, Jashurek charged him with 
resisting arrest in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104  
(West 1983) ("section 5104").  A jury convicted Nelson at a trial 





Court of Common Pleas.  While we do not know whether Nelson 
appealed his criminal conviction, he does not claim that any 
court has set aside the conviction or that the validity of the 
conviction has been thrown into doubt in any other proceeding.  
We thus decide this appeal on the assumption that the conviction 
is unimpaired. 
 In this civil case, which Nelson filed after the 
conviction, Jashurek and Nelson filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  The district court referred the motions to a 
magistrate judge who filed a report and recommendation on August 
28, 1996.  In his motion, Jashurek argued that Nelson did not 
prove the essential elements of his claim because Nelson could 
not show that Jashurek had used an objectively unreasonable 
amount of force, and he thus was entitled to qualified immunity. 
 Jashurek also claimed that he was entitled to a summary judgment 
in his favor on the basis of collateral estoppel predicated on 
the findings in the criminal trial at which the jury convicted 
Nelson. 
 The magistrate judge found that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), governs this case.  In Heck v. 
Humphrey the Supreme Court made it clear that an action under 
section 1983 could not be maintained on the basis of events 
leading to a conviction which has not been reversed or impaired 
by other official proceedings if a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff in the civil case would imply that the conviction was 
invalid.  Id. at 2372.  The magistrate judge then cited the 





be brought unless the underlying conviction has been reversed or 
otherwise impaired: 
 An example of this latter category--a § 1983 
action that does not seek damages directly 
attributable to conviction or confinement but 
whose successful prosecution would 
necessarily imply that the plaintiff's 
criminal conviction was wrongful--would be 
the following: A state defendant is convicted 
of and sentenced for the crime of resisting 
arrest, defined as intentionally preventing a 
peace officer from effecting a lawful arrest. 
 (This is a common definition of that 
offense.  See People v. Peacock,68 N.Y.2d 
675, 505 N.Y.S.2d 594, 496 N.E.2d 683 (1986); 
4 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 593, p. 
307 (14th ed. 1981).)  He then brings a § 
1983 action against the arresting officer, 
seeking damages for violation of his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures.  In order to prevail in this § 1983 
action, he would have to negate an element of 
the offense of which he has been convicted.  
Regardless of the state law concerning res 
judicata . . . the § 1983 action will not 
lie. 
 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2372 n.6.   
 The magistrate judge then concluded as follows: 
 Plaintiff's cause of action is a due process 
claim for use of excessive force in his 
arrest.  However, he was convicted of the 
crime of resisting arrest based on this 
incident in state court.  Because he was 
convicted of the crime of resisting arrest in 
state court, his claim here is precisely that 
described by the Supreme Court in the quoted 
material above as one that will not lie until 
the underlying conviction is reversed or 
called into question.  This claim, having not 
accrued, must be dismissed. 
 
App. at 11.  Consequently, the magistrate judge recommended that 
the district court grant Jashurek's motion and deny Nelson's 
motion.  The magistrate judge did not consider any basis for 





and thus she did not consider Jashurek's qualified immunity 
defense.   
 The district court adopted the report and 
recommendation and thus it granted Jashurek's motion and denied 
Nelson's motion.  In adopting the report and recommendation, the 
district court, like the magistrate judge, relied only on Heck v. 
Humphrey.  Nelson then appealed from the district's court order, 
but only to the extent that the district court granted Jashurek's 
motion as Nelson does not contend that the court should have 
granted his motion.  Rather, he requests that we remand the case 
for consideration of his excessive force claim. 
 
 
 II. DISCUSSION 
 Exercising plenary review, Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets 
Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993), 
we will reverse the district court order to the extent that it 
granted Jashurek summary judgment.  A comparison of the elements 
of the state criminal convictions and Nelson's claim against 
Jashurek, compels the conclusion that if the proceedings on the 
remand are conducted in accordance with the guidelines we set 
forth in this opinion, a judgment in Nelson's favor would not 
throw the validity of the judgment of conviction in the criminal 
case into doubt.  Nelson was convicted for resisting arrest in 
violation of section 5104 which provides that a person is guilty 
of resisting arrest if “with the intent of preventing a public 
servant from effecting a lawful arrest [he] creates a substantial 





means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the 
resistance.”  (Emphasis added.). 
 The district court treated Nelson's inartfully drafted 
pro se complaint as stating a claim under section 1983 and 
analyzed the complaint under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
standard.  The district court was undoubtedly correct in this 
approach, and on the remand which will follow this opinion, the 
district court should grant Nelson leave to amend his complaint 
to assert his claims under section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. 
 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 
(1989); United State v. Johnstone, No. 95-5833, slip op. at 6-9. 
 (3d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 
F.3d 945, 962 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 176 (1995).  A 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry is objective, so the 
question in this case is whether Jashurek's actions in 
effectuating the arrest were objectively reasonable without 
regard for his underlying intent or motivation.  See Johnstone, 
slip op. at 7. 
 We have read the charge to the jury delivered in the 
state criminal case and note that the trial judge, in accordance 
with section 5104, told the jury that if Nelson's actions “did 
not justify substantial force by [Jashurek], you must find Mr. 
Nelson not guilty.”  App. at 122.  Clearly, therefore, inasmuch 
as the jury found Nelson guilty and therefore must have concluded 
that Jashruek was justified in using "substantial force," Heck v. 
Humphrey would bar this action if Nelson's case depended on a 





"substantial force" in arresting him.  Our difficulty with the 
district court's result is that the fact that Jashurek was 
justified in using "substantial force" to arrest Nelson does not 
mean that he was justified in using an excessive amount of force 
and thus does not mean that his actions in effectuating the 
arrest necessarily were objectively reasonable.  In short, there 
undoubtedly could be "substantial force" which is objectively 
reasonable and "substantial force" which is excessive and 
unreasonable.   
 Yet a finding that Jashurek used excessive "substantial 
force" would not imply that the arrest was unlawful and thus the 
Supreme Court's example of how Heck v. Humphrey can bar a civil 
action is not applicable here.  Rather, we believe that the 
Supreme Court intended to demonstrate that a civil suit for an 
unreasonable seizure predicated on a false arrest would be barred 
so long as a conviction for resisting the same arrest remained 
unimpaired.  But this case is different because Nelson does not 
charge that Jashurek falsely arrested him.  Instead, Nelson 
charges that Jashurek effectuated a lawful arrest in an unlawful 
manner.  Accordingly, while we do not doubt that even on the 
facts as presented by Nelson it will be difficult for him to 
establish liability in this case, we do not see why a judgment in 
his favor would throw the validity of his conviction into doubt. 
 Cf. Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("Because a successful section 1983 action for excessive force 
would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Smithart's arrest 





stop], Heck does not preclude Smithart's excessive force 
claim.").  Consequently, Heck v. Humphrey does not bar this case, 
and we cannot affirm the order of the district court on the 
authority of that case. 
 We add an important caveat.  The proceedings in the 
district court must go forward on the basis that Nelson's 
conviction was valid unless the conviction is impaired in other 
proceedings such as a reversal on direct appeal, expungement by 
executive order, a declaration of invalidity in a state 
proceeding, or the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a 
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
at     , 114 S.Ct. at 2372; see Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 
91-92 (3d Cir. 1996); Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 611 (1996).  Therefore, in the 
absence of any such impairment, if this case reaches trial, the 
trier of fact must be aware that Jashurek was justified in using 
"substantial force" in arresting Nelson.  Otherwise there would 
be a danger that in returning a general verdict against Jashurek 
predicated on a finding that he used excessive force, the trier 
of fact might base its verdict on findings not consistent with 
the conclusion the jury reached in the criminal case, i.e., that 
Jashurek was justified in using "substantial force" to arrest 
Nelson. 
 Heck v. Humphrey precludes the return of a verdict in 
this civil case on the basis of a finding by the jury the 
Jashurek was not entitled to use substantial force to arrest 





with Nelson's conviction.  See Lal v. Borough of Kennett Square, 
935 F. Supp. 570, 574-75 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Shelton v. Macey, 883 
F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  In essence, then, the 
guiding principle on the remand should be taken from Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 133 (1965): “If the means employed by the 
actor for the purpose of effecting the arrest or recapture of 
another, or of maintaining the actor's custody of him, are in 
excess of those which he is privileged to use . . . the actor is 
liable for only so much of the force as is excessive.”  We 
reiterate that Nelson's conviction establishes that Jashurek was 
privileged to use substantial force.  We leave it to the district 
court on remand to determine whether it will instruct the jury 
that Nelson was convicted of resisting arrest or whether the 
court merely will tell the jury that Jashurek was justified in 
using substantial force to arrest Nelson. 
 In reaching our result we take note of Simpson v. City 
of Pickens, 887 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Miss. 1995).  The district 
court in Simpson held that even if a defendant in a criminal 
action was convicted validly of resisting arrest, the criminal 
defendant was not necessarily barred from bringing a section 1983 
excessive force action under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
because “it is possible for a finding that [the defendant] was 
resisting arrest to coexist with a finding that the police used 
excessive force to subdue him.”  Id. at 129.  We are in accord 
with the Simpson analysis. 
 Jashurek presents an alternative ground to affirm, 





to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.  While we 
will assume that if the district court had denied Jashurek's 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity 
and he then appealed we could have exercised jurisdiction 
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817 (1985), the district 
court never ruled expressly on the qualified immunity defense for 
it granted Jashurek summary judgment on the basis of Heck v. 
Humphrey alone.  Furthermore, in these circumstances, we cannot 
say that the court inferentially denied the motion for summary 
judgment to the extent that Jashurek predicated it on a claim of 
qualified immunity.  Cf. Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2d 
Cir. 1988) ("[I]nterlocutory review is appropriate when a 
district court denies a motion for summary judgment without 
addressing a proffered qualified immunity defense.").  Thus, even 
if we disregard the fact that Jashurek understandably has not 
filed a notice of appeal, we cannot regard this case as an appeal 
from the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
of qualified immunity, and consequently, we do not have 
jurisdiction on the basis of the collateral order doctrine.  
 Instead, as Jashurek correctly recognizes, brief at 14, 
he raises qualified immunity as an alternative ground to affirm, 
and we consider the defense only on that basis.  After a careful 
review of the matter we have concluded that we should not 
consider the qualified immunity defense in the first instance, 
particularly as genuine disputes of material facts may exist with 





course, Jashurek is free to renew his motion for summary judgment 
on the basis of qualified immunity on the proceedings on the 
remand in the district court. 
 
 
 III. CONCLUSION 
 In closing we emphasize that we have made a narrow 
ruling on the law in this case.  Thus, we do not suggest that 
Nelson ultimately may be able to recover nor do we render any 
opinion on the validity of Jashurek's qualified immunity defense 
or whether he used excessive force.  Nevertheless, in view of our 
conclusions, we will reverse the judgment of September 19, 1996, 
to the extent that it granted Jashurek summary judgment under 
Heck v. Humphrey and will remand the case to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
